



## **Briefing Report**

### **Direct Commitments**

**(Original June 21, 2013)**

**(Addendum April 1, 2014:  
starts on page 13)**

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### ***Issue:***

A direct commitment/bench commitment occurs when the court orders a youth into commitment placement usually as part of a plea arrangement between the state attorney and the defense attorney. In this instance, the Pre-Disposition Report (PDR) requirement is waived. The PDR is the mechanism by which the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice (FDJJ) provides a recommendation to the court. Without the PDR, the FDJJ is not provided an opportunity for the commitment staffing process that includes a comprehensive evaluation to help identify the appropriate recommendation to the court. The court usually does direct commitments/bench commitments on felony offenses, though some jurisdictions may do a direct commitment on misdemeanors, especially when they believe the FDJJ will not recommend residential commitment. This process allows the court to bypass the requirement of a written explanation as to the reasons for a deviation from FDJJ's recommendation.

According to Florida Administrative Code (63D-8.001(2)), the commitment conference is defined as a "multidisciplinary staffing conducted to discuss the department's recommendation to the court for youth who may be appropriate for residential commitment. Participants may include the youth, parent(s)/guardian(s), Juvenile Probation Officer (JPO), Juvenile Probation Officer Supervisor (JPOS), Commitment Manager, school officials, service providers, and other parties involved in the youth's case". In the event of a direct commitment, the commitment conference is held after the disposition to residential placement and a Post-Disposition Report is completed. A Post-Disposition Report process is defined in Florida Administrative Code (63D-9.003(6)(e)) as "The JPO shall complete a Post-Disposition Report, which, like the predisposition report, indicates what the child's risks and priority needs are, but is only completed if residential commitment has been ordered by the court without a predisposition report ever having been ordered. In order to ensure appropriate placement and services, the Post-Disposition Report shall be completed within 14 working days following the disposition". Therefore, for the youth identified as direct commitments, the court did not have the Pre-Disposition Report and Comprehensive Evaluation information or the FDJJ recommendation available when making the decision to commit. However, the FDJJ does conduct a Post-Disposition Report and Comprehensive Evaluation in order to best identify risk factors and service needs for the residential program to address.

The purpose of this briefing is to examine all youth released from residential placement during Fiscal Year 2010-11 to compare those committed with a recommendation to the court with those who were direct commitments/bench commitments.

### ***Highlighted Results:***

- Males and minority youth, as well as low risk to re-offend youth constitute significantly higher proportions of direct commitments than they do non-direct commitments (2.25 times more low risk to re-offend youth are direct commitments compared to low risk to re-offend youth that are non-direct commitments). Direct commitment therefore arguably exacerbates already high rates of disproportionate minority contact (DMC), specifically minority males, within the juvenile justice system;
- High risk to re-offend youth constitute a significantly higher proportion of non-direct commitments than they do direct commitments (43% of non-direct commitments are high risk youth, compared to 30% of direct commitments);
- Youth who are non-direct commitments have significantly higher criminal history scores, indicating more priors, more serious priors, and more prior deeper-end placements than direct commitment youth;
- Youth who are non-direct commitments have significantly higher scores on a global measure of risk including areas such as school (enrollment, conduct, attendance and performance), delinquent peer associations, history of running away/getting kicked out of the house, family incarceration history, alcohol and drug use, physical/sexual abuse or neglect history, and history of mental health problems;
- Direct commitment youth have either equivalent or *lower* risk on a multitude of individual/social/environmental measures, with the exception of current alcohol and substance use. Alcohol and substance use were the only two risk items in which direct commitment youth were higher risk than non-direct commitment youth;
- Direct and non-direct commitment youth have statistically identical recidivism rates, though direct commitments are composed of over 21% low risk youth, compared to 9% of non-direct commitments being low risk youth;
- Overall, there is no indication that direct commitment youth are obvious choices for commitment based on prior criminal history or prominent risk factors. Any underlying process to determine direct commitment appears to be based on extralegal factors unrelated to either public safety or to the most promising treatment for the youth;
- The recidivism rate of direct commitment youth is over 8% higher than the rate for statistically identical youth placed on probation supervision. The rate is 10% higher for low risk matched youth and over 17% higher for moderate risk matched youth.


### ***Methodology:***

Data used for these analyses included all fiscal year 2010-11 (July 1, 2010 to June 30, 2011) releases from residential commitment (5,737 total releases). These data were matched to the corresponding most recent C-PACT assessment prior to the residential placement for each youth. The C-PACT assessment captures the youth's overall risk to re-offend and rank orders the youth's top risk factors.

The C-PACT assessment has been validated across multiple samples of Florida DJJ youth, published in multiple peer-reviewed journals and independent research agency reports (Baglivio, 2009; Baglivio & Jackowski, 2013; Early-Winokur, Blankenship, & Hand, 2012). The closest C-PACT assessment prior to placement was used in order to capture the youth’s risk to re-offend level and risk and protective factors when the placement occurred, which is the profile of the youth at the time he/she presented in court. This provides a comprehensive portrayal of each youth at the time the event (the commitment) occurred. The C-PACT information would not have been available for direct commitment youth, while that information would have been an essential component underlying the recommendation for non-direct commitment youth.

A direct commitment/bench commitment measure was constructed for each youth (a dichotomous “yes” or “no”). The conference summary was used to gather whether the commitment was direct or not. Direct commitments were compared to non-direct commitments on measures such as demographics, overall risk to re-offend at the time of commitment, seriousness and extent of criminal history, and a global social history measure of risk including areas such as school (enrollment, conduct, attendance and performance), delinquent peer associations, history of running away/getting kicked out of the house, family incarceration history, alcohol and drug use, physical/sexual abuse or neglect history, and history of mental health problems. Individual C-PACT items were also compared, as were outcome measures of successful completion and recidivism rates. Independent samples t-tests were the primary analysis strategy used in the comparison of the two groups (direct and non-direct commitments). Logistic Regression was used to examine whether individual C-PACT items or demographic information predict direct commitment.

**FIGURE 1.**



**Results:**

There were a total of 5,737 releases from residential commitment programs during FY 2010-11. Of those releases, 839 (14.6%) were placed via direct commitments, and 4,898 (85.4%) were non-direct commitments. Of the direct commitments 88.3% were male, compared to 84.2% of the non-direct commitments. This difference was statistically significant ( $p=.001$ ), indicating direct commitment is composed of a higher proportion of males. Just fewer than 40% (39.6%) of the direct commitments were white youth, compared to 45.5% of the non-direct commitments. This difference was statistically significant ( $p=.001$ ), indicating minority youth are more likely to be the recipient of a direct commitment. In comparison of direct and non-direct commitments by C-PACT overall risk to re-offend level, a significantly higher proportion of direct commitments were low risk to re-offend ( $p<.001$ ). Overall risk to re-offend level by commitment type (direct or non-direct) can be seen in Figure 1. These results indicate the youth that are direct commitments are lower risk youth than non-direct commitments, indicating public safety cannot be the underlying reason for the direct commitment.

In light of the finding that a much higher proportion of direct commitment youth are low risk to re-offend (2.25 times more low risk), the next step was to examine whether there were differences in the two components of overall risk to re-offend: criminal history and social history. The criminal history score of the C-PACT captures the seriousness and extent of prior offending as well as prior placements and restrictiveness of those placements. The criminal history score ranges from 0-31 possible points. The average criminal history score for the direct commitments was 11.57 compared to 12.97 for non-direct commitments. This difference was statistically significant ( $p<.001$ ), indicating direct commitment youth score lower on a measure of criminal history showing they have less prior offenses, less serious priors, and less restrictive prior placements. The social history global score, as described above, is a measure of risk including areas such as school (enrollment, conduct, attendance and performance), delinquent peer associations, history of running away/getting kicked out of the house, family incarceration history, alcohol and drug use, physical/sexual abuse or neglect history, and history of mental health problems. The social history score ranges from 0-18, with direct commitment youth having an average of 6.4 and non-direct and average of 7.03 (that difference is statistically significant at  $p<.001$ ). This indicates direct commitment youth not only have less priors/less serious priors and placements, they have lower scores on a global measure of many of the most prominent risk factors of re-offending.

**INDIVIDUAL C-PACT ITEM COMPARISONS:**

One may hypothesize as to the type of cases that would be potential candidates for a direct commitment. Perhaps youth who began offending at a younger age, or had more serious prior offenses (such as felonies, weapons/firearm charges, against-person offenses, or sexual offenses), or youth who were misbehaving at school, missing school, or getting bad grades may be targeted. Other potential hypotheses include youth who associate with gang members, had prior DCF placements, a history of running away, failure to obey parental rules, alcohol or drug abuse, or a history of mental health problems or abuse/neglect histories. These types of situations could be hypothesized to play into the decision for the attorneys to ask the court to use direct commitment. Each of these options was examined to compare the prevalence of the specific indicator between direct and non-direct commitments (using independent samples t-tests).

**Age at First Offense:**

Research has indicated offending at a young age is predictive of later delinquency, with early-onset offenders have a two to three times higher risk of later serious, violent, and chronic offending (Loeber and Farrington, 2001), and that youth who begin offending earlier are more likely to carry guns, become gang members, and engage in substance use (Howell, 2009). 37% of non-direct commitments were youth that had an age at first offense of 12 years old and younger, compared to 31% of direct commitments. The difference was significant ( $p < .001$ ) indicating non-direct commitment youth are more likely to have begun their criminal offending at an earlier age.

**Felony Referrals:**

There was no difference between the two groups on whether the youth had three or more prior felony offenses.

**Weapon Referrals:**

There was no difference between the two groups on whether the youth had a history of an offense that was a firearm/weapon charge.

**Against-person Felony Referrals:**

There was no difference between the two groups on whether the youth had three or more prior against-person felony offenses (such as aggravated assault).

**Felony Sexual Offense Referrals:**

3% of direct commitment youth had a criminal history that contained at least one arrest for a felony sexual offense, compared to 5% of youth that were non-direct commitments. The difference was statistically significant ( $p = .004$ ) indicating direct commitments are significantly *less* likely to be youth with a history of felony sexual offenses.

**Detention Placements:**

More extensive history of prior detention placements was examined with 44% of non-direct commitment youth having three or more prior detention placements over 48 hours, compared to 28% of direct commitment youth. The difference was statistically significant ( $p < .001$ ) indicating non-direct commitment youth have more prior detention stays over two days.

**Pick up Orders for Failure to Appear or Absconding:**

The hypothesis that youth who have a history of failing to appear for court, or of absconding while on supervision would be more likely to be direct commitments was examined. 30% of non-direct commitment youth had two or more failures to appear in court or absconding supervision that resulted in a pick-up order being issued compared to 21% of direct commitment youth. The difference was statistically significant ( $p < .001$ ), indicating non-direct commitment youth more likely to have a history of failure to appear or absconding while on supervision.

**Current School Enrollment Status:**

There were no significant differences between direct and non-direct commitment youth in whether the youth were graduates/obtained a GED, were currently enrolled in school full time, currently enrolled part time, or were suspended. There were significant differences in whether the youth were currently dropped out, or expelled, with non-direct commitments more likely to currently have dropped out and to currently be expelled from school ( $p=.002$  and  $p<.001$ , respectively).

**Current School Conduct:**

There were no significant differences between direct and non-direct commitments in whether the youth were recognized for good behavior, had no problems with school conduct, had problems reported by teachers, had problem calls to their parents, or had calls to the police for school misconduct.

**Current School Attendance:**

There were no significant differences between direct and non-direct commitments in school attendance (whether perfect attendance, some unexcused absences, or habitual truant).

**Current School Performance:**

There were no significant differences between direct and non-direct commitments with respect to the academic performance (as measured by GPA) for proportions that are honor students, above 3.0 GPA, 2.0 to 3.0, and below 1.0. Non-direct commitment youth were more likely to have a GPA between 1.0 and 2.0 (significant at  $p=.048$ ).

**Current Relationships:**

The importance of the friendship/peer network of youth is in keeping with a long line of research showing the effects of delinquent peer associations on delinquency, and the importance of reducing the influence of those antisocial peers (differential association) (Akers, 1998; Andrews & Bonta, 2003). Direct commitment youth were significantly *more* likely to have prosocial friends ( $p<.001$ ) than non-direct commitment youth. Furthermore, non-direct commitment youth were more likely to have antisocial friends and to have gang member/associate friends ( $p<.001$  and  $p<.001$ , respectively). The proportion of non-direct commitment youth that had gang member/associate friends was two times that of direct commitment youth.

**Family History:**

One could hypothesize that youth who have been court-ordered to be removed from their homes, had Department of Children and Families (DCF) placements, or shelter care placements may be more likely to be removed from their volatile home environment again via a direct commitment. However, there were no significant differences between direct and non-direct commitments in whether the youth had a history of court-ordered or DCF voluntary out-of-home and shelter care placements over 30 days.

**Running Away:**

39% of direct commitment youth had a history of running away or getting kicked out of the home, compared to 48% of non-direct commitment youth. The difference was statistically significant

( $p < .001$ ) indicating non-direct commitment youth are more likely to have a history of running away or getting kicked out of their home.

**Parental Authority and Control:**

There were significant differences between direct and non-direct commitment youth in regards to the extent to which youth obey and follow parental rules. Direct commitment youth were more likely to “usually obey and follow rules” ( $p < .001$ ), while non-direct commitment youth were more likely to be rated as “consistently disobeys and/or is hostile” ( $p < .001$ ).

**Alcohol and Substance Use:**

There were significant differences between direct and non-direct commitment youth in regards to use of alcohol and drugs within the last 6 months. Direct commitment youth were more likely to have current alcohol use and more likely to have current drug use ( $p = .004$  and  $p = .044$ , respectively). This is the only risk domain in which direct commitment youth were higher risk than non-direct commitment youth. To the extent that state attorneys and the judiciary are cognizant a youth has alcohol or substance use histories, one could hypothesize there may be belief that youth are in need of substance abuse treatment and residential commitment may be a viable option if there is a lack of faith in community-based treatment options.

**History of Mental Health Problems:**

Non-direct commitment youth are significantly more likely to have a history of mental health problems than direct commitment youth ( $p = .001$ ). This result is encouraging as it indicates youth are not being committed (via a direct commitment) to residential placement due to having a mental health diagnosis or issue.

**History of Physical Abuse:**

One could hypothesize that youth who have a history of physical abuse or neglect could be more likely to be quickly removed from a volatile home environment via direct commitment. However, there was no significant difference between the proportions of youth with a history of being physically abused that are direct or non-direct commitments. Results did indicate non-direct commitments are composed of a significantly higher proportion of youth with a history of being neglected.

**MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS PREDICTING DIRECT COMMITMENT:**

The relationships established above between individual domains/factors and direct commitments were examined in multivariate models. As the C-PACT assessment was administered prior to the commitment (whether non-direct where the information was used in the recommendation, or direct where the information was not available via the assessment results), the domains/items of the C-PACT can be used to predict which youth are more likely to be direct commitments. As the dependent variable (direct commitment) is dichotomous (either the youth was a direct commitment or not), logistic regression is an appropriate analytical strategy. In the first model, the overall C-PACT risk level, whether the youth was a minority, and the sex of the youth (female or male) was used to predict direct commitment. Results show that the higher the risk to re-offend level, the *less* likely the

youth was to be a direct commitment. For every one unit change in risk level (for example moving from low to moderate risk, moderate to moderate-high, and moderate-high to high) there is a 31% decrease in the odds of being a direct commitment (for each unit change). Minority youth and males were both significantly more likely to be direct commitments.

The next step in the analysis examined the individual C-PACT items with respect to whether the youth was a direct commitment. Again, logistic regression was used with direct commitment as the dependent outcome with the following items entered as predictor variables:

- Sex (female, male)
- Minority status (white, non-white)
- Age at first offense (15 and over, 13 to 14, or 12 and under)
- Extent of prior felonies (less than 3, 3 or more)
- Prior weapons/firearm charges (none, 1 or more)
- Prior against-person felony charges (less than 3, 3 or more)
- Prior felony sex offenses (0 or 1, 2 or more)
- Prior detention placements (2 or less, 3 or more)
- Prior pick-up orders/failure to appear (0 or 1, 2 or more)
- Currently dropped out or expelled from school (no, yes)
- School conduct problems (no, reported by teachers or calls to parents or police)
- School attendance problems (not truant, habitual truant over 15 unexcused absences)
- School performance problems (GPA over 2.0, GPA under 2.0)
- Peer Network (prosocial friends, antisocial friends, gang member/associate)
- Prior DCF placement (no placements, placements)
- History of running away (less than 4 times, 4 or more)
- Obeying parental rules (obeys, disobeys)
- Current alcohol use (no, yes)
- Current drug use (no, yes)
- History of physical abuse (no, yes)
- History of neglect (no, yes)
- History of mental health problems (no, yes)

Results from the analysis can be seen in Table 1. Results indicate several items that are significant predictors of being a direct commitment. Males and minority youth are significantly more likely to be direct commitments. Youth who currently use alcohol (within the last six months) are also significantly more likely to be direct commitments. Youth who began offending earlier in life (early age of onset of criminal behavior at 12 years old or younger) are significantly more likely to be non-direct commitments. Youth with more prior detention placements, youth who are currently dropped out or expelled from school, youth with GPA under 2.0, and youth who consistently disobey parents' rule are all significantly more likely to be non-direct commitments as well. The remaining items examined were not significant predictors of direct or non-direct commitment.



The Odds Ratio (reported as Exp(B) in Table 1) can be used to explain the relationship within each measure to being a direct or non-direct commitment (only for items marked as significant, in bold). The odds of a male being a direct commitment are 1.282 times the odds of a female being a direct commitment. The odds of a minority youth being a direct commitment are 1.43 times the odds of a white youth being a direct commitment. Stated differently, being male is associated with a 28.2% increase in being a direct commitment, and being a minority is associated with a 43% increase. For items that are significant (indicated in bold in Table 1) where the Beta (B) is negative, the Odds Ratio interpretation can be figured by subtracting the value from 1. For example, youth with lower school performance are significantly less likely to be a direct commitment ( $p=.021$ ,  $\text{Exp}(B)=.805$ ). Subtracting the Odds Ratio from 1 (1 being perfect odds, or 100%) yields the value of .195 ( $1-.805=.195$ ) indicating youth with poor school performance are 19.5% less likely to be a direct commitment.

**TABLE 1.**

<b>Regression Results for Predicting Direct Commitment</b>			
	<b>B</b>	<b>Significance</b>	<b>Exp(B)</b>
Sex	0.248	<b>.044*</b>	1.282
Minority	0.358	<b>.000**</b>	1.43
Age at First	-0.178	<b>.001**</b>	0.837
Felonies	-0.083	0.35	0.92
Weapon Offenses	-0.032	0.752	0.969
Against Person	-0.001	0.997	0.999
Felony Sex	-0.834	0.264	0.434
Detention	-0.573	<b>.000**</b>	0.564
Pick-up Orders	-0.138	0.168	0.871
Drop out/Expelled	-0.411	<b>.001**</b>	0.663
School Conduct	-0.01	0.909	0.99
School Attendance	0.022	0.856	1.023
School Performance	-0.217	<b>.021*</b>	0.805
Peer Network	0.038	0.559	1.039
DCF Placements	0.066	0.544	1.068
Running Away	-0.165	0.159	0.848
Obey Parents	-0.264	<b>.008**</b>	0.768
Alcohol Use	0.173	<b>.047*</b>	1.189
Drug Use	0.075	0.453	1.078
Physical Abuse	0.07	0.528	1.072
Neglect	-0.188	0.225	0.828
Mental Health	-0.085	0.375	0.918

Note: \*=significant at  $p<.05$ ; \*\*=significant at  $p<.01$ ; positive Beta (B) values when significant indicate more likely to be a direct commitment; Negative Beta (B) values indicate more likely to be non-direct commitment.

**RECIDIVISM OUTCOMES:**

The next step was to examine important performance outcomes of the two groups of youth (direct and non-direct commitments). First, we examine the proportion of each group that successfully completed the residential placement resulting from the commitment. Results show 87.5% of the direct commitments successfully completed the placement, compared to 90.9% of the non-direct commitments. This difference was statistically significant ( $p=.006$ ), indicating the proportion of non-direct commitments that successfully complete the commitment placement is higher than the proportion of direct commitment youth that successfully complete.

Re-offending rates were examined to compare the recidivism of direct commitments to that of non-direct commitments. Just fewer than 41% (40.9%) of direct commitments were adjudicated/had adjudication withheld for an offense within 12 months of completion of residential placement, compared to just fewer than 41% (40.7%) for non-direct commitments. This difference was not statistically significant, indicating the re-offense rates of the two groups are statistically identical. This result is particularly important in light of the fact that over 20% of the direct commitment youth were low risk to re-offend, compared to just over 9% of the non-direct commitment youth. Therefore, even though direct commitment youth were 2.25 times more likely to be low risk, the recidivism rates of the two groups are identical. These results are in keeping with the Risk Principle which shows intensive services for low risk to re-offend youth are iatrogenic, meaning they have the unintended consequence of actually *increasing* recidivism likelihood (Andrews & Bonta, 2003; Andrews & Kiessling, 1980; Andrews, Zinger, Hoge, Bonta, Gendreau, & Cullen, 1990; Lipsey, 2009; Lipsey, Howell, Kelly, Chapman, & Carver, 2010). Direct commitment youth arguably have worse performance outcomes, illustrated by having 1.5 times less high risk youth than non-direct commitment while achieving identical re-offending outcomes.


**RECIDIVISM BY RISK LEVEL:**

Next, we examined whether recidivism rates for non-direct and direct commitment youth differed by overall risk to re-offend level as assessed by the C-PACT. Figure 2 illustrates the recidivism rates by risk level for both non-direct and direct commitment youth. Results show similar re-offending rates for three of the four overall risk levels. However, the recidivism rate for moderate risk youth who were direct commitments was 42.9%, compared to 33.1% for non-direct commitments. This difference of 9.8% for moderate risk youth is statistically significant ( $p=.029$ ), indicating moderate risk to re-offend youth that were direct commitments have a significantly (and substantially at a 29.6% *increase*) higher recidivism rate than moderate risk to re-offend youth that were not direct commitments.

To further explore the large difference for between moderate risk direct and non-direct commitments, we examined the criminal history and the global social history scores for each group to explore whether the direct commitment youth had slightly a higher number or seriousness of prior offending and placements, or higher prominent risk factors. However, independent samples t-tests analyses revealed no significant differences on either metric. Moderate risk to re-offend youth that were direct commitment youth were more likely to recidivate, even with statistically identical criminal history and social history scores. Additional analyses for the other three risk levels (low,

moderate-high, and high) revealed that direct and non-direct commitment youth within each risk category did not differ on either the criminal or global social history score.

**FIGURE 2.**



***Implications:***

The purpose of this brief is to compare youth who were direct commitments to youth that were non-direct commitments. Comparisons were made on the overall risk to re-offend level of the youth, a measure of criminal history extent and seriousness, a measure of global social history risk, as well as individual items from the validated C-PACT assessment. The two groups (direct and non-direct) were also compared on two essential outcomes: proportion that successfully completed the placement, and recidivism rate. Results show that the youth who are direct commitments are more likely to be minority, male, lower risk to re-offend, with less extensive criminal and social history indicators. On the vast majority of individual items examined across criminal history, school, peer networks, family situations, and mental health, non-direct commitment youth evidenced either equivalent or more risk than direct commitment youth. The only indicators in which direct commitment youth evidenced more risk were current alcohol use, and current drug use. These results demonstrate that whatever process is being used to target youth for direct commitment is not benefiting from the extensive literature on risk assessment and risk factors of juvenile offending. Therefore, it is not in the interest of either public safety, or of providing the most appropriate services to the youth. Direct commitment is being used for lower risk to re-offend youth. Furthermore, direct commitment is escalating the already high rates of disproportionate minority contact (DMC) in the juvenile justice

system by being used on a higher proportion of minority youth, particularly males, than the non-direct commitment process that benefits from a recommendation from FDJJ and validated risk assessment and comprehensive evaluation information.

The most recent available data on residential commitment, as of May 2013, is presented in Appendix A below. Appendix A presents commitment data, by county, for the period of May 1, 2012 through April 30, 2013. The data indicate the number of low, moderate, moderate-high, and high risk youth that received a non-direct and a direct commitment in each county. The data also indicate the total number of direct and non-direct commitments, total number of commitments (direct + non-direct), and the percent of those commitments that were direct commitments (number of direct/total number of commitments). It is essential to examine the total number of commitments when comparing counties on the percent of commitments that were direct, as some counties had very few commitments making percentages highly susceptible to sample sizes (for example, Washington county had 100% of their commitments as direct commitments, but only one commitment occurred during the year study period). The percentage of commitments that were direct ranges from a low of 0% (for 14 of the 67 counties) to a high of 100% (1 county).

***Future Research:***

Future research initiatives should include using more advanced statistical techniques, such as propensity score matching (PSM), to compare recidivism outcomes for direct commitment youth to those of statistically identical youth receiving various placement options (diversion, probation, day treatment, redirection, etc.). PSM would allow for conclusions related to which placement options are best for youth at varying risk levels with specific profiles of risk indicators. Future research should examine the court practices in those counties with high percentages of direct commitments and compare them to counties without as much direct commitment.

## DIRECT COMMITMENTS ADDENDUM

Based on recommendations in the future directions section above, this addendum study was conducted to examine re-offending rates of youth who were direct commitments compared to matched youth who received probation supervision. Using Propensity Score Matching (PSM), an advanced matching technique, we are more able to compare “apples to apples”. Propensity score models are designed to mimic randomized control trails (RCTs), such as those used in medical research wherein one group receives the treatment and the control group receives “business as usual” or a placebo (Shadish, 2013). Since random assignment of disposition to probation or commitment is usually not feasible or morally justifiable in some instances, advanced matching techniques are the next best approach as they approximate random assignment. PSM allows us to match youth on a range of characteristics that pre-date their exposure to the “treatment” (in this case C-PACT scores and criminal history, which pre-dates the disposition to commitment or probation).

The following 24 measures were used to match youth receiving a direct commitment to youth who received to probation supervision (sample from youth released in fiscal year 2010-11):

*Demographics.* These three measures include the youth’s gender, race, and age at admission to service. Gender (0=female, 1=male) and race (0=White, 1=non-White) were coded dichotomously. Age at admission to commitment (for direct commitment youth) or probation was classified as either twelve years old or younger, thirteen, fourteen, fifteen, sixteen, seventeen, or eighteen and over (coded 1-7, respectively). Therefore, the larger the age at admission value, the older the youth was at admission to residential or probation.

*Overall risk to re-offend.* The overall risk to re-offend level was taken from the Positive Achievement Change Tool (PACT) risk/need assessment used by the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice. Several studies have examined the validity of the PACT with different samples of Florida juvenile offenders (Baglivio, 2009; Baglivio & Jackowski, 2013; Winokur-Early, Hand, & Blankenship, 2012). The PACT classifies youth according to four overall risk levels: low, moderate, moderate-high, and high risk to re-offend (coded 1-4, respectively). Therefore the higher the overall risk to re-offend value, the higher risk the youth. The PACT administered prior to admission to service (commitment or probation supervision) was used as it captures the risk and needs of the juvenile when he/she was referred to service, prior to any reduction in risk that may accompany service provision.

*Criminal history.* One sub-score of the PACT is the criminal history score. This score measures the extent of prior offending and prior juvenile justice placements. Prior research has indicated the best predictor of future behavior is past behavior and those with extensive priors more likely to offend in the future (Loeber, Farrington, & Petechuk, 2003; Nagin & Paternoster, 2000; Robins, 1978). Criminal history is measured 0 to 31 and takes into account the number of prior adjudicated misdemeanors, felonies, weapon offenses, against-person felonies, secure detention placements, residential commitment placements, escapes, and failures to appear. The exact scoring of the criminal history score of the PACT is proprietary. The criminal history components of the PACT are automated from

the JJIS database and not dependent on the recall of the youth. The measure is coded from 0 (having no criminal history score) to 31 (having the maximum possible criminal history score).

*Global “social risk”.* The second sub-score of the PACT is the social history score. This score is measured 0 to 18 and includes aspects of current school enrollment, attendance, performance, and conduct. Also included are aspects of running away, parental jail/imprisonment history, and trauma history (physical abuse, sexual abuse, neglect, mental health problem history, history of witnessing violence). The exact scoring and item weights of the social history score are proprietary. Like criminal history, the global social risk measure is coded from 0 to 18 (having none of the social risk to having all of the possible social risk score).

*Most serious prior.* The most serious prior adjudicated offense was classified as other delinquency, misdemeanor, other felony, property felony, or violent felony (coded 1-5). The higher the most serious prior value, the *more* serious the most prior offense committed by that youth was.

*Age at first offense.* Longitudinal studies (21 of them) have reported a significant relationship between early onset and later crime, with similar findings for both males and females (Howell, 2009; see also Krohn, Thornberry, Rivera, & LeBlanc, 2001). Research consistently agrees that early-onset offenders have a two to three times higher risk of later serious, violent, and chronic offending (Loeber & Farrington, 2001), and offenders that start earlier are more likely to carry guns, become gang members, and engage in substance use (Howell, 2003). Age at first offense is captured and classified by the PACT. For this study age at first offense is coded as: fifteen years of age or older, thirteen or fourteen, and twelve and under (coded 0-2, respectively). Therefore, the lower the age at first offense value, the *older* the youth was at the time of his/her first offense for which he/she was referred (arrested).

*Antisocial peer association.* Delinquent peer association has consistently been shown as one of the strongest predictors of delinquency risk (Akers, 1998; Osgood, Wilson, O’Malley, Bachman, & Johnston, 1996). Recent research has proposed a two-pronged impact of peer influence with both a historical risk component through deviant normative influence, as well as a form of situational risk through immediate temptations and opportunities (Thomas & McGloin, 2013; see also Haynie & Osgood, 2005), rather than arguing for one or the other. Peer association was captured in the following five categories: exclusively prosocial peer association, no peer association/limited friends, prosocial and antisocial peer association, exclusively antisocial peer association, and association with gang members/gang associates (coded 0-4, respectively).

*Substance use.* Current alcohol or drug use was captured by the PACT and classified into three categories. Youth who were not currently using (within the last 6 months) drugs or alcohol, youth who were currently using drugs or alcohol, and youth for which their current use of drugs or alcohol was contributing to life problems (coded 0-2, respectively). The current problems included drug or alcohol use disrupting education, causing family conflict, interfering with keeping prosocial friends, causing health problems, contributing to criminal behavior (drunk or high when committing crime, needing to commit crime to pay for habit), needing increasing amounts, or experiencing withdrawal problems.

*Felony criminal history.* This measure captures whether the youth has had a history of a felony adjudication/adjudication withheld, and if so, how many. Categories include no felonies, one felony, two felonies, or three or more felonies (coded 0-3, respectively). The higher the score, the more felonies the youth has in his/her criminal history. Arguably youth with more prior felonies would receive a direct commitment; therefore this was included as a matching measure.

*Weapon offenses.* Being adjudicated or having adjudication withheld for a weapon offense may lead youth to be more likely to receive direct commitment. This measure classified youth as having a history of such offenses or not (binary, coded 0 or 1).

*Against person felony offense.* This measure captures whether the youth has a history of an against person felony offense, and if so, how many. Youth were classified as having no against person felony offenses, one or two against person felony offenses, or three or more against person felony offenses (coded 0-2, respectively). These offenses involve force or physical harm to another person including sexual misconduct as defined by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) as violent felonies. Arguably, youth with a history of these offenses are more likely to receive direct commitment.

*Felony sex offense.* This measure captures whether the youth has a history of a felony sexual offense, and if so, how many. Youth were classified as having no felony sex offenses, one felony sex offense, or two or more felony sex offenses (coded 0-2, respectively).

*Detention.* Youth were classified as to whether they had a history of two or fewer prior detention placements of greater than 48 hours, or three or more detention placements of greater than 48 hours (binary, coded 0 or 1).

*Pick up orders.* Youth were classified as to whether they had a history of one or fewer pick up orders for a failure to appear in court, or two or more pick up orders for failure to appear in court (binary, coded 0 or 1).

*Prior residential commitments.* Arguably, youth who have been committed to residential placement previously may be more likely to receive a direct commitment. This was included as a matching measure classifying youth as having no prior commitments, one prior commitment, or two or more prior commitments (coded 0-2, respectively).

*Prior history of running away or getting kicked out of the house.* This measure was dichotomized into youth that had a history of 3 or fewer instances of running away or getting kicked out of the house, and those with four or more such instances (binary, coded 0 or 1). Each instance is only counted if the youth was gone from the home for over 24 hours.

*Physical abuse.* Youth were classified as to whether they had no history, or a history of being physically abused (binary, coded 0 or 1).

*Neglect.* Youth were classified as to whether they had no history, or a history of being a victim of neglect (binary, coded 0 or 1).

*Mental Health.* Youth were classified as to whether they had no history, or a history of mental health problems (binary, coded 0 or 1). Mental health problems include diagnosed schizophrenia, bi-polar, mood, thought, personality, and adjustment disorders. Oppositional defiant, conduct disorder, and ADD/ADHD were not counted in this measure.

*Department of Children and Families history.* Youth were classified as to whether they had no history, or a history of out of court-ordered or Department of Children and Families voluntary out-of-home or shelter care placements exceeding 30 days (binary, coded 0 or 1).

*Parental rule adherence.* A measure of the extent to which the youth adheres to rules set forth by his/her parents was included. This measure classifies youth as usually obeying and following rules, sometimes obeying or obeying some rules, or consistently disobeying rules or exhibiting hostility towards rules set forth by parents (coded 1-3 respectively). While this measure is self-report, collaborative information from parents/guardians is elicited by the juvenile probation officer completing the PACT assessment as per PACT training, policies, and procedures. The higher the value, the less the youth adheres to parental rules.

*Current school enrollment.* This measures whether the youth has graduated/received a GED, is currently enrolled in school, or has dropped out or been expelled for over 6 months (coded 1-3, respectively). Arguably, a youth that has dropped out or been expelled is more likely to receive a direct commitment.

The intent of PSM is to match youth on all of the potential measures that would lead to some youth receiving the “treatment” outcome (in this case direct commitment), as well as any measures that would lead to differences in the final outcome (in this case recidivism). Prior research (both FDJJ and in the field of criminology at large) indicates the 24 measures we have included may all be related to re-offending and may be determining factors as to whether a youth receives a direct commitment. PSM only matches youth for which there is an equitable match in both groups.

Table 2 illustrates whether the two groups (direct commitments and probation youth) differed on each of the measures before matching and then after matching. PSM should make any differences seen initially become insignificant after successful matching. As shown in Table 2, this was indeed the case. Initially the full sample of each group is compared (733 direct commitment youth and 33,444 probation supervision youth). The two groups significantly differed initially on 23 of the 24 measures (as indicated by the asterisk). The only measure not significantly different was felony sex offenses. Direct commitment youth were no more likely to have a history of felony sexual offense, or an extensive history of such offenses as probation supervision youth. Direct commitment youth were a larger proportion male, minority, older at admission, higher risk overall, more criminal history, higher global social risk, more serious worst prior, younger at age of first offense, more likely to have delinquent peers, more substance use and problems associated with that use, a greater felony history, twice as likely to have a weapon offense, more felony against person offenses, more



detention placements, more pick up orders, more prior commitments, more instances of running away, almost twice the likelihood of physical abuse and neglect, more DCF history, more likely to disobey parents, and were more likely to have dropped out or been expelled. In essence, direct commitment youth were more likely to re-offend/be high risk than probation supervision youth. The goal of PSM is to match youth such that the two groups become equivalent on all of these measures.

**Table 2. *t* Test Results Comparing Direct Commitment and Probation Supervision on Selection Factors for Full and Matched Samples of All Youth**

	Full Sample			Matched Sample		
	Probation Supervision (n=33,444)	Direct Commitment (n=733)	<i>t</i> Value	Probation Supervision (n=723)	Direct Commitment (n=723)	<i>t</i> Value
Gender	.69 (.00)	.88 (.01)	<b>-15.7**</b>	.86 (.01)	.88 (.01)	-0.9
Race	.42 (.00)	.59 (.02)	<b>-9.3**</b>	.59 (.02)	.59 (.02)	-0.2
Age at Admission	4.53 (.01)	5.18 (.05)	<b>-13.9**</b>	5.2 (.05)	5.2 (.05)	0.0
Overall Risk Level	1.46 (.03)	2.62 (.04)	<b>-28.0**</b>	2.6 (.04)	2.6 (.04)	-0.8
Criminal History Score	5.76 (.01)	11.23 (.20)	<b>-27.5**</b>	24.2 (.46)	25 (.46)	-1.09
Social History Score	3.73 (.01)	6.31 (.11)	<b>-23.5**</b>	30 (.58)	30.1 (.59)	-1.109
Most Serious Prior	3.16 (.01)	4.30 (.03)	<b>-34.1**</b>	2.2 (.05)	2.2 (.05)	.258
Age at First Offense	.68 (.00)	1.00 (.03)	<b>-10.8**</b>	.97 (.03)	1.0 (.03)	-0.7
Antisocial Peers	1.21 (.01)	1.52 (.04)	<b>-7.8**</b>	1.5 (.04)	1.5 (.04)	-0.1
Substance Use	.27 (.00)	.61 (.02)	<b>-14.1**</b>	.57 (.03)	.60 (.02)	-0.8
Felony History	.66 (.00)	1.58 (.04)	<b>-23.4**</b>	1.5 (.04)	1.6 (.04)	-0.3
Weapon Offense	.07 (.00)	.18 (.01)	<b>-7.6**</b>	.17 (.01)	.18 (.01)	-0.3
Against Person Felony	.17 (.00)	.36 (.02)	<b>-9.5**</b>	.33 (.02)	.36 (.02)	-1.3
Felony Sex Offense	.02 (.00)	.03 (.01)	-1.2	.03 (.01)	.03 (.01)	0.1
Detention	.07 (.00)	.27 (.02)	<b>-12.4**</b>	.23 (.02)	.27 (.02)	-1.6
Pick Up Orders	.06 (.00)	.20 (.01)	<b>-9.1**</b>	.18 (.01)	.20 (.01)	-0.9
Prior Commitments	.07 (.00)	.33 (.02)	<b>-8.4**</b>	.29 (.02)	.32 (.02)	-1.2
Running Away	.05 (.00)	.13 (.01)	<b>-6.4**</b>	.13 (.01)	.13 (.01)	-0.4
Physical Abuse	.09 (.00)	.16 (.01)	<b>-4.9**</b>	.16 (.01)	.16 (.01)	0.2
Neglect	.04 (.00)	.07 (.01)	<b>-3.1**</b>	.07 (.01)	.07 (.01)	-0.2
Mental Health	.14 (.00)	.22 (.02)	<b>-5.6**</b>	.22 (.02)	.22 (.02)	0.1
DCF History	.09 (.00)	.17 (.01)	<b>-6.0**</b>	.17 (.01)	.17 (.01)	0.1
Parental Rules	1.47 (.00)	1.91 (.01)	<b>-18.0**</b>	1.9 (.02)	1.9 (.02)	-0.2
School Enrollment	2.04 (.00)	2.20 (.02)	<b>-8.4**</b>	2.2 (.02)	2.2 (.02)	-1.2


Note: mean reported with standard error in parentheses; \* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , one tailed test; the matched sample was generated using the nearest-neighbor matching without replacement, caliper=.05.

Examining the right side of table 2 shows 723 of the 733 direct commitment youth were able to be matched to a probation supervision youth. The matched sample, therefore, includes only the 723 youth that received direct commitment and the 723 probation supervision youth to which they were

matched. Furthermore, we see that none of the 23 previously significant measures remained different between the two groups (indicated by no bold type or asterisks in the far right column). Essentially, the two groups are now statistically identical on all 24 measures. This indicates that our PSM was successful and that we may now compare the recidivism rates of the two groups and will be comparing “apples to apples”. Given an identical youth, will receiving a direct commitment or probation supervision more likely lead to success? It is important to recall that the 723 youth we matched on actually received direct commitment. Therefore, we are NOT examining whether direct commitment is better/worse for any low risk probation youth. We are examining whether direct commitment was the right option, in terms of public safety as our outcome measure is recidivism.


The final step is to examine the outcome measure of interest: recidivism (see Figure 3). Initially, prior to matching, the 33,444 probation supervision youth had an average recidivism rate of 17.4%, compared to an average rate of 40.8% for the 733 direct commitment youth. This difference was statistically significant ( $p < .001$ ), with a large effect size (Cohen’s  $d = .93$ ). Based on Table 2 for the full sample, which shows the direct commitment youth were higher risk on 23 of the 24 measures examined, this result makes sense. Examining the recidivism rates for the 723 matched probation youth and 723 matched direct commitment youth reveals a rate of 32% for the probation supervision youth, and 40.7% for the direct commitment youth. This difference was significant ( $p = .001$ ), with a small effect size (Cohen’s  $d = .18$ ). Matching youth on the 24 measures certainly decreased the recidivism differences, from a 23.4% difference to 8.7%. However, an almost 9% reduction in re-offending from not using direct commitment to using probation supervision for statistically identical youth is very meaningful. Nine percent less offenders among 723 youth equates to 65 fewer youth that would have re-offended had they received probation supervision rather than direct commitment. One should also account for the savings to taxpayers in the form of criminal justice costs and victim costs based on the crimes that would have been prevented.

**Figure 3.**



The identical process was conducted only just for the low risk youth in the same, then just for the moderate risk youth in the sample. There were 24,533 low risk to re-offend probation supervision youth, and 166 low risk to re-offend youth that received direct commitments. Initially, these two groups differed significantly on 13 of the 24 measures examined. Post-matching, 157 youth remained in each group (9 direct commitment youth were not able to be matched on our strict criteria). These matched youth differed on only one measure (parental rule adherence,  $p = .033$ ), where the direct commitment youth had slightly more risk (which is less than the number of measures to be expected by chance). There were 3,995 moderate risk to re-offend probation supervision youth that were matched to 146 moderate risk direct commitment youth. These youth initially differed on 11 of the 24 measures. Post-matching 141 youth remained in each group (5 direct commitment youth could not be matched). These moderate risk matched youth did not differ on any of the 24 measures examined. Figure 4 illustrates the recidivism rates of the low and moderate risk unmatched and matched comparison groups. The low and moderate risk recidivism rates for both the unmatched and the matched probation supervision samples were significantly lower than their direct commitment counterparts. For the matched samples, both the low risk and the moderate risk differences were small to moderate effect sizes (Cohen's  $d = .24$  and  $.39$ , respectively). **In sum, all results clearly show probation supervision to be superior to direct commitment if public safety and lower recidivism rates are the goals.**

Figure 4.



**APPENDIX A. Direct and Non-Direct Commitments by County and PACT risk: May 2012-April 2013**

County	Direct/Not Direct	High	Mod_High	Mod	Low	Total per Type	Total Commitments	Percent Direct Commit
Alachua	Not Direct	31	39	16	1	87	109	20.2%
Alachua	Direct	5	8	6	3	22		
Baker	Not Direct	1	2	1	2	6	6	0.0%
Baker	Direct							
Bay	Not Direct	18	8			26	29	10.3%
Bay	Direct	2	1			3		
Bradford	Not Direct	2	3			5	5	0.0%
Bradford	Direct							
Brevard	Not Direct	52	28	3	1	84	113	25.7%
Brevard	Direct	13	7	6	3	29		
Broward	Not Direct	109	168	9	12	298	395	24.6%
Broward	Direct	27	36	8	26	97		
Calhoun	Not Direct	3				3	6	50.0%
Calhoun	Direct	1	2			3		
Charlotte	Not Direct	13	6	2	1	22	22	0.0%
Charlotte	Direct							
Citrus	Not Direct	12	8	2	1	23	62	62.9%
Citrus	Direct	10	13	7	9	39		
Clay	Not Direct	25	6	5	4	40	70	42.9%
Clay	Direct	11	6	8	5	30		
Collier	Not Direct	23	19	8	1	51	53	3.8%
Collier	Direct			1	1	2		
Columbia	Not Direct	3	1			4	9	55.6%
Columbia	Direct	3	1		1	5		
Dade	Not Direct	107	70	34	11	222	223	0.4%
Dade	Direct	1				1		
Desoto	Not Direct	2	1			3	9	66.7%
Desoto	Direct	3	1	2		6		
Dixie	Not Direct	2		1		3	7	57.1%
Dixie	Direct		1	2	1	4		
Duval	Not Direct	90	48	36	2	176	344	48.8%
Duval	Direct	60	40	33	35	168		
Escambia	Not Direct	68	74	25	4	171	187	8.6%
Escambia	Direct	6	7	1	2	16		
Flagler	Not Direct	8		1	2	11	17	35.3%
Flagler	Direct	3		1	2	6		
Franklin	Not Direct			1		1	2	50.0%
Franklin	Direct		1			1		
Gadsden	Not Direct	2	5	2		9	12	25.0%
Gadsden	Direct		2	1		3		
Gilchrist	Not Direct		2			2	2	0.0%
Gilchrist	Direct							
Hamilton	Not Direct	1				1	2	50.0%
Hamilton	Direct	1				1		
Hardee	Not Direct	1	2			3	3	0.0%
Hardee	Direct							
Hendry	Not Direct	6	3	2		11	11	0.0%
Hendry	Direct							
Hernando	Not Direct	16	9	1		26	26	0.0%
Hernando	Direct							
Highlands	Not Direct	14	9	1		24	24	0.0%
Highlands	Direct							
Hillsborough	Not Direct	69	36	3		108	108	0.0%
Hillsborough	Direct							
Holmes	Not Direct		2			2	3	33.3%
Holmes	Direct		1			1		
Indian River	Not Direct	14	17	4	2	37	39	5.1%
Indian River	Direct	1			1	2		
Jackson	Not Direct	2				2	9	77.8%
Jackson	Direct	3	3		1	7		
Lafayette	Not Direct		1			1	1	0.0%
Lafayette	Direct							
Lake	Not Direct	22	14	4		40	54	25.9%
Lake	Direct	9	4	1		14		

County	Direct/Not Direct	High	Mod_High	Mod	Low	Total per Type	Total Commitments	Percent Direct Commit
Lee	Not Direct	89	36	7	1	133	136	2.2%
Lee	Direct		3			3		
Leon	Not Direct	21	22	8	4	55	139	60.4%
Leon	Direct	25	24	20	15	84		
Ley	Not Direct	9	1	3	1	14	14	0.0%
Ley	Direct							
Madison	Not Direct	4	1			5	7	28.6%
Madison	Direct	1			1	2		
Manatee	Not Direct	37	21	9	2	69	72	4.2%
Manatee	Direct		2		1	3		
Marion	Not Direct	37	28	10	1	76	96	20.8%
Marion	Direct	10	5	3	2	20		
Martin	Not Direct	14	7	2		23	34	32.4%
Martin	Direct	5	2	4		11		
Monroe	Not Direct	5				5	5	0.0%
Monroe	Direct							
Nassau	Not Direct	10	5	3		18	22	18.2%
Nassau	Direct	3		1		4		
Okaloosa	Not Direct	27	18	5	1	51	60	15.0%
Okaloosa	Direct	4	5			9		
Okeechobee	Not Direct	1	2			3	6	50.0%
Okeechobee	Direct		1	2		3		
Orange	Not Direct	103	61	6	1	171	204	16.2%
Orange	Direct	17	8	3	5	33		
Osceola	Not Direct	28	15	3	1	47	48	2.1%
Osceola	Direct	1				1		
Palm Beach	Not Direct	79	26	14	3	122	123	0.8%
Palm Beach	Direct	1				1		
Pasco	Not Direct	40	9	2	1	52	53	1.9%
Pasco	Direct	1				1		
Pinellas	Not Direct	130	27	5	1	163	169	3.6%
Pinellas	Direct	3	2	1		6		
Polk	Not Direct	88	58	6	5	157	160	1.9%
Polk	Direct	1	1		1	3		
Putnam	Not Direct	13	5			18	19	5.3%
Putnam	Direct		1			1		
St Johns	Not Direct	11	9	2	1	23	35	34.3%
St Johns	Direct	2	6	2	2	12		
St Lucie	Not Direct	29	18	1		48	50	4.0%
St Lucie	Direct	1	1			2		
Santa Rosa	Not Direct	24	15	2	2	43	48	10.4%
Santa Rosa	Direct	2	1	1	1	5		
Sarasota	Not Direct	11	16	5		32	44	27.3%
Sarasota	Direct	5	4	3		12		
Seminole	Not Direct	31	7	1		39	63	38.1%
Seminole	Direct	13	8	1	2	24		
Sumter	Not Direct	4	2			6	6	0.0%
Sumter	Direct							
Suwannee	Not Direct		4	2		6	15	60.0%
Suwannee	Direct	4	2	1	2	9		
Taylor	Not Direct		1			1	3	66.7%
Taylor	Direct			1	1	2		
Union	Not Direct	1	1	1		3	3	0.0%
Union	Direct							
Volusia	Not Direct	60	29	9		98	115	14.8%
Volusia	Direct	7	8	2		17		
Wakulla	Not Direct	1	3	2		6	7	14.3%
Wakulla	Direct			1		1		
Walton	Not Direct	7	3			10	15	33.3%
Walton	Direct	1	3		1	5		
Washington	Not Direct						1	100.0%
Washington	Direct			1		1		

Note: Data for the period of May 2012 through April 2013.

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